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"Lawyer as Public Citizen" - A Futile Attempt

to Close Pandora's Box
MATTHEW

E. MEANY*

INTRODUCTION

The American Bar Association's Model Rules of Professional
Conduct ("Rules"), adopted by every state legislature except California,'
include a prescription for the duties and responsibilities of the legal
profession. 2 In the Preamble, the Rules begin with the well-known premise
and directive that lawyers should be zealous advocates in serving their
clients' interests.3 The Rules further require that lawyers strive to prove
facts and to provide legal bases in support of those interests,4 to abide by
their clients' decisions regarding the objectives of representation,5 and to
consult with their clients on the means pursued to reach those objectives. 6
The Rules, therefore, cultivate an advocacy ethic that relies on the
adversary system to yield the public values of truth and justice as a
* Matthew Meany is a defense attorney with the firm of Willson, Jones, Carter & Baxley,
P.A. in Charlotte, NC. A special thanks to the following scholars for comments and
feedback on this article: Robert Scott, the Alfred McCormack Professor at Columbia
University School of Law and former Dean of the University of Virginia School of Law;
William Sullivan, Senior Scholar at the Carnegie Foundation for the Advancement of
Teaching; Anne Colby, Senior Scholar at the Carnegie Foundation for the Advancement of
Teaching; Russell Pearce, the Edward and Marilyn Bellet Professor of Legal Ethics,
Morality, and Religion at Fordham University School of Law; Amy Timmer, Associate
Dean of Students and Professionalism at the Thomas M. Cooley Law School; Robert
Vischer, Associate Professor at the University of St. Thomas Law School; Jeffrey Brauch,
Dean of the Regent University School of Law; Kevin Lee, Professor at Campbell University
School of Law; Diane Soubly, Senior Counsel at Seyfarth Shaw LLP and past member of
the Michigan State Bar Professional Standards Committee; Paul Lehto, former member of
the Washington State Board of Governors and Washington Supreme Court Continuing
Legal Education Committee.
1. Alphabetical List of States Adopting Model Rules, AM. BAR Ass'N, http://www.
americanbar.org/groups/professional-responsibility/publications/model rules-of profession
alconduct/alphalist stateadoptingmodelrules.html (last visited Jan. 15, 2013).
2. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT (2009).

3. Id. pmbl. 2.
4. Id. R. 3.1 & cmt. 1.
5. Id. R. 1.2(a).
6.

Id.
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byproduct of opposing attorneys' efforts to secure a favorable outcome for
their clients. Only later, however, do the Rules seek to limit this sweeping
characterization of "lawyer as zealous advocate" by introducing a lawyer's
conflicting and vaguely defined obligation to be a "public citizen."'
Indeed, the Rules provide little guidance on what a "public citizen" is and
how to reconcile these conflicting roles.
This Article illustrates how the Rules themselves predispose
practitioners to embrace the role of "zealous advocate" at the expense of
"public citizen." Further, it shows how the legal education system and the
myriad of pressures faced by a lawyer combine to marginalize "public
citizen" considerations in representation. Finally, it proposes a solution
that would minimize the cognitive dissonance felt by attorneys who seek
full actualization of their duties under the Rules.
Section I establishes the origin of the problem in the Rules, which
place conflicting professional duties on attorneys in relation to their clients
and to society. Section I then develops the paradox by parsing the term
"zealous advocate" and examining the etymology and connotations elicited
by its use, followed by an exploration of the Rules' vague charge to
attorneys as "public citizens" to act in the best interest of society, the law,
and justice. Finally, Section I concludes with analysis exposing the
impotence and inadequacy of the "public citizen" duty as a constraint on
the means and ends adopted during representation.
Section II discusses the impropriety of establishing "zealous
advocacy" as the starting point and model baseline for the legal profession,
incorporating the perspectives of a few prominent legal ethics scholars.
Section II then illustrates how the context and pressures of real world
advocacy illuminate the practical shortcomings of the Rules, forcing
practitioners to choose between roles that vary in their consequences for
abandonment. Section II concludes by examining how the combination of
skills, pressures, and insufficient guidance in the Rules exacerbates a
lawyer's predisposition to embrace the "zealous advocate" role to the likely
denigration of the "public citizen" role.
Section III discusses the emphasis of the current mainstream
curriculum in legal education on the role and tools of "zealous advocacy"
to the effective exclusion of "public citizen" concerns. In addition, Section
III explores how the prioritization of winning in legal education and
practice has Pyrrhic implications for both the lawyer and society.
Section IV critiques the proposals of several contemporary legal
commentators, focusing on their practical shortcomings.
7. Id. pmbl. j 6.
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Section V concludes this Article by proposing an alternate and more
comprehensive solution than legal ethics scholarship to date, culling
various useful elements from existing proposals and combining them with
elements and ideas that address a broader range of practical issues.
SECTION I

The Preamble to the Rules establishes the internal conflict of roles
which, unsurprisingly, manifests itself in results unintended by the ABA
drafters. The Preamble begins by broadly stating the three main roles a
lawyer plays in the legal system: "a representative of clients, an officer of
the legal system and a public citizen." 8 By structuring the opening of the
Rules in this manner, the drafters indicate that these roles carry equal
weight and importance. However, the Rules quickly place paradoxical
duties on attorneys when they proceed to define the conflicting loyalties
associated with those roles in the Preamble's subsequent paragraphs.
In Paragraph Two, the Preamble defines "representative of clients" to
include the duty to serve as a zealous advocate for a client's interests. 9
Subsequently, the Preamble places on attorneys, as "public citizens," the
duty to seek "the administration of justice."'o Although the Preamble fails
to define these terms further, a problem in and of itself, the use of the terms
"public" and "justice" reasonably means that attorneys have a duty to
produce results that are objectively right and that correspond to societal
values. Thus, these duties cause a pointed conflict every time an attorney
engages in representation of a client whose successful assertion of claims
or objectives would not comport with a "public" conception of justice.
The nature of the attomey-client relationship and client expectations
illuminate the paradox. A client hires an attorney to produce an outcome
favorable to that client, irrespective of whether that outcome is just or right
in an objective sense. More than likely, the client's only concern is
whether she ultimately prevails, not whether societal justice is achieved in
the process. However, the Rules obligate her attorney to care about this
second goal.1" Thus, an attorney can only fulfill both duties under the
8. Id. pmbl. 1 1. This inquiry will focus on the roles of "zealous advocate," a subpart
of "representative of clients," and "public citizen."
9. Id. pmbl. 2 ("As advocate, a lawyer zealously asserts the client's position under
the rules of the adversary system.").
10. Id. pmbl. T 6 ("As a public citizen, a lawyer should seek improvement of the law,
access to the legal system, the administration of justice and the quality of service rendered
by the legal profession.").

11. See id.

Published by Scholarly Repository @ Campbell University School of Law, 2012

3

Campbell Law Review, Vol. 35, Iss. 1 [2012], Art. 4

122

CAMPBELL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 35:119

Rules when zealous advocacy for her client furthers the attainment of
Stated differently, only when a client's subjective
public justice.
conception of justice corresponds to the public's objective conception of
justice can an attorney fulfill both duties imposed on her by the Rules.
When victory for a client through zealous advocacy is not objectively just,
an attorney fails in her "public citizen" duty. Conversely, when an attorney
facilitates a publicly just outcome that prejudices her client's interests in
some way, she has failed in her "zealous advocate" duty. In short, an
attorney must violate one of her duties under the Rules when a client's
objectives are not aligned with public justice.
The ABA drafters explicitly reject this reality. Paragraph Eight of the
Preamble states the drafters' contention that "[a] lawyer's responsibilities
as a representative of clients, an officer of the legal system and a public
citizen are usually harmonious." 12 As a central but undeclared premise, the
Rules assume that the duties of the required roles typically coincide and are
achieved simultaneously. By dismissing the probability of conflict
between the roles in the first sentence, the ABA drafters fail to
acknowledge every situation in which it is impossible both to win for one's
client and to attain the objectively just result under the circumstances.
Since the drafters discount the likelihood of such scenarios, it is not
surprising that the Rules fail to provide guidance for reconciling these
antithetical responsibilities. Beyond the discomfort felt by attorneys unable
to reconcile their conflicting duties under such circumstances, they are
often burdened with moral and ethical dissonance after being forced to
pursue a course of action from an imperfect set of choices.
While failing to provide any kind of useful framework to help lawyers
reconcile conflicts in their required roles, the ABA drafters did attempt to
comfort lawyers by providing an unsatisfactory palliative for such
situations. In the second sentence of Paragraph Eight of the Preamble, the
Rules state that "when an opposing party is well represented, a lawyer can
be a zealous advocate on behalf of a client and at the same time assume that
justice is being done." 13 Here, the drafters simply advise a lawyer to
"assume" that the morally right party will always win if both parties are
"well represented," another faulty premise that discounts the high
probability of a dispositive mismatch between any two opposing counselors
regarding their relative skill, experience, resources, or a factual or
procedural advantage in any given case. If by "well represented," the
Rules mean "equally represented," then the Rules again fail to connect with
12. Id.pmbl. 8.
13. Id. (emphasis added).
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reality, because equal representation is rarely the case; the scales are almost
always tipped from the outset.14
Further, and most importantly, the statement suggests that lawyers
should not burden themselves directly with the "public citizen" concern of
ensuring that justice is achieved and should simply "assume that [it] is
being done."15 In doing so, the Rules essentially advocate willful blindness
on the part of counsel, who may know very well under the posture of a
particular case that zealous advocacy will thwart an objectively just
outcome, especially where one of the aforementioned advantages exists.
This rationalization comforts very few lawyers who care about fulfilling
both the zealous advocate and public citizen roles. After all, lawyers are
trained to recognize subtle, yet significant, distinctions and can easily see
the inherent problem with assuming that they can fulfill their public citizen
duty to administer justice by pursuing a course of action adverse to that
goal. Besides, few would agree that something as important as justice
should be left to assumptions.
By using "zealous," a term carrying historically violent and extreme
connotations, the ABA drafters may have exceeded their intended
characterization of a lawyer's advocacy responsibilities.' 6 People often
have difficulty forgetting powerful imagery or applying subsequent
limitations to such impressions to reduce their initial impact or potency. 17
In other words, if an original description is too strong, it may prove to be
resistant or even impervious to subsequent restrictions and modifications.
One manifestation of this principle is the widely recognized "halo effect,"
which is the psychological phenomenon whereby a person who has made a
strong, positive first impression on another maintains that high esteem,
despite multiple instances of subsequent behavior that should logically
reduce or negate the positive regard originally attributed to that person.
On a broader level, this principle applies equally to negative impressions
14. See generally DAVID COLE,
(2000).

No EQUAL JUSTICE: RACE AND CLASS IN THE AMERICAN

CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM

8 (2009).
16. See, e.g., Zealous Definition, ONLINE ETYMOLOGY DICTIONARY, http://www.
etymonline.com/index.php?search=zeal (last visited Jan. 15, 2013) (defining "zealot" as
"member of a militant 1st century Jewish sect which fiercely resisted the Romans in
Palestine").
17. See, e.g., Kayla Causey & Aaron Goetz, The Halo Effect in Overdrive, A NATURAL
HISTORY OF THE MODERN MIND (Jul. 1, 2009), http://www.psychologytoday.com/
blog/natural-history-the-modem-mind/200907/the-halo-effect-in-overdrive (describing the
"halo effect," discussed infra).
18. Id.
15. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT pmbl.
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and to those which concern one's understanding of a particular subject.19
The ABA drafters' choice of the term "zealous advocate" is one such
example of this concept. It contains two terms that convey great strength 2 0
but likely exceed the scope of commitment to the client that the drafters
intended to articulate. In particular, the modifier "zealous" bears many
connotations that the drafters likely do not endorse. 2 1 Consequently, a
lawyer's understanding of her role after reading the tenacious "zealous
advocate" characterization is not likely to be diluted or constrained by the
limitations the Rules seek to impose through the subsequent and conflicting
"public citizen" characterization.
In its tamest definition, the word "zealous" means "marked by fervent
partisanship for a person, cause, or an ideal." 2 2 While its meanings clearly
include the kind of passion the drafters intended to instill in lawyers
advocating the claims and causes of their clients, a closer look at the
etymology of the word reveals that its use as a descriptor may be misplaced
in light of the lawyer's "public citizen" duties. Although synonyms for
"zealous" include "passionate," "devoted," "enthusiastic," and "keen," they
also include "militant," "fanatical," and "rabid." 23 In several dictionaries
providing usage examples, the term is used in the context of a sincere or
fanatical devotion to religion.24
Indeed, lexicographers universally
incorporate violence, fanaticism, or intolerance to opposing views into their
definitions of the root terms "zealot" 2 5 and "zealotry." 26
19. Id.
20. See supra note

16 and accompanying text; Advocate Definition, ONLINE
supra note 16, at http://www.etymonline.com/index.
php?allowed-inframe-0&search=advocate&searchmode-none (defining "advocate" as
"protector, champion, patron").
21. See supra note 16 and accompanying text.
22. Zealous Definition, MERRIAM-WEBSTER,
http://www.merriam-webster.com/
dictionary/zealous (last visited Jan. 15, 2013).
23. Zealous Definition, THEFREEDICTIONARY, http://www.thefreedictionary.com/zealous
(last visited Jan. 15, 2013).
24. See, e.g., Zealous Definition, WEBSTER-DICTIONARY.ORG, http://www.websterdictionary.org/definition/zealous (last visited Jan. 15, 2013); Zealous Definition,
YOURDICTIONARY.COM, http://www.yourdictionary.com/zealous (last visited Jan. 15, 2013).
25. See, e.g., Zealot Definition, SHORTER OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY (Oxford
ETYMOLOGY

University

DICTIONARY,

Press

CD-ROM,

6th

ed.

2007);

Zealot Definition, DICTIONARY.COM,

http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/zealot (last visited Jan. 15, 2013); Zealot Definition,
THEFREEDICTIONARY, supra note 23, at http://www.thefreedictionary.com/zealot;

THESAURUS.COM,

Zealot,

http://thesaurus.com/browse/zealot (last visited Jan. 15, 2013); Zealot

Definition, WEBSTER-DICTIONARY.ORG,
supra note 24, at
http://www.websterdictionary.org/definition/zealot; Zealot Definition, YOURDICTIONARY.COM, supra note 24, at

http://www.yourdictionary.com/zealot.

http://scholarship.law.campbell.edu/clr/vol35/iss1/4

6

Meany: “Lawyer as Public Citizen” – A Futile Attempt to Close Pandora’s

2012]

LAWYER AS PUBLIC CITIZEN

125

Historically, the Zealots were a fanatical Jewish sect most notorious
for their militant resistance to the Roman Empire in the ludaea Province in
the first century A.D. 27 The Zealot movement, characterized by opposition
to Roman rule via sporadic rebellions throughout that century, sanctioned
the murder of Jews who they believed had collaborated with the Romans. 2 8
The term "zealot" derives from the Greek "zelotes," meaning "one who is a
zealous follower," and its Hebrew counterpart, "kanai" or "qannaim,"
which is characterized as being "zealous for his God." 29 The Zealot
movement is most notorious for the Great Jewish Revolt (A.D. 66-70),
which led to the complete destruction of the city of Jerusalem. 30 In their
final stand, nearly one thousand Zealots captured the Roman fortress of
Masada, taking no prisoners and successfully repelling Roman attempts to
recapture the stronghold for three years. 3' When the Romans finally
penetrated the fortress, they found that the Zealots had committed suicide
in an act of defiance and devotion rather than allow themselves to be
captured.32
As the history that burdens the term's roots illustrates, the extremist
connotations attributed to "zealous" are quite negative. One source aptly
captures the overbearing essence of the term by defining its correlative,
zealotry, as "undue or excessive zeal; fanaticism." 33 This Article refers to
the terms "zealous," "zealot," and "zealotry" interchangeably both because
26. See, e.g., Zealotry Definition, DIcTIONARY.COM, supra note 25, at http://dictionary.
reference.com/browse/zealotry; Zealotry Definition, THEFREEDICTIONARY, supra note 23, at

http://www.thefreedictionary.com/zealotry; Zealotry, THESAURUS.COM,
http://thesaurus.com/browse/zealotry;

supra note 25, at

Zealotry Definition, WEBSTER-DICTIONARY.ORG,

supra note 24, at http://www.webster-dictionary.org/definition/zealotry; Zealotry Definition,
YOURDICTIONARY.COM, supra note 24, at http://www.yourdictionary.com/zealotry.
27. FLAVIUS JOSEPHUS, Antiquities of the Jews (Book XVII), in 3 THE WORKS OF
FLAVIUS JOSEPHUS 53, 53-57 (William Whiston trans., London, J. Richardson and Co.
1822); S.G.F. BRANDON, JESUS AND THE ZEALOTS 46-47 (1967).
28. BRANDON, supra note 27, at 46 ("To secure these ideals, [the Zealots] were

prepared to resort to violent action against . . . those of their countrymen whose acceptance
of Roman rule was particularly notable.").
29. BRANDON,

supra note 27, at

43-44, 43 n.3; Zealot, ONLINE ETYMOLOGY

DICTIONARY, supra note 16, http://www.etymonline.com/index.php?term=zealot&allowed
in frame=0.
30. JOSEPHUS, supranote 27, at 54; BRANDON, supra note 27, at 30.
31. BRANDON, supranote 27, at 142-43.
32. FLAVIUS JOSEPHUS, The Jewish War (Book 1), in 3 THE WORKS OF FLAVIUS

JOSEPHUS 251, 272-73 (William Whiston trans., London, J. Richardson and Co. 1822);
BRANDON, supra note 27, at 58.

33. Zealotry, DICTIONARY.COM,
browse/zealotry (emphasis added).

supra note 25, at http://dictionary.reference.com/
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they derive from a common origin and because their meanings are
inextricably entwined. In any case, the use of the word "zealous" in its
advocacy context is not a compliment. Its use carries with it extremist
undertones that more aptly describe the type of "blind militarism" and
willingness to sacrifice everything that modem Islamic Fundamentalists
and terrorist groups employ in purported furtherance of their causes.3 4 In
this light, "zealous" suggests a willingness to employ any means necessary
to achieve stated ends and to reject a thorough inquiry into the legitimacy
or various costs of those means. 35 The lawyer analogue would be to win
for one's client with no regard to the sacrifices and costs involved,
including, but not limited to, morality, ethics, and justice.
Certainly, the ABA drafters could not have intended such an extreme
role with such sweeping implications for the range of conduct permissible
in furtherance of a client's ends under the Rules. But, even assuming
lawyers understand "zealous" in its least fanatical sense, too great a risk
arises of willful or negligent misinterpretation of the term by lawyers who
may cite its codification in the Rules as an official justification for all
action necessary to achieve victory at any cost. The use of "zealous" to
modify "advocate" in the Rules creates a morally and ethically dangerous
grey area that lawyers can leverage to their own, and their clients',
advantage.
The dangers of abuse are compounded by several additional factors,
such as various pressures and insufficient limitations, which are expounded
below. 36 The drafters erred in using such a poignant term to describe the
ideal client representative, especially since the term "advocate" already
carries a connotation of strength. Commonly defined as "one that pleads
the cause of another" or "one that defends or maintains a cause or
proposal," 3 7 the term "advocate" also implies that the proponent possesses
greater knowledge, skill, or ability than the represented party or general
public. While the ABA drafters' desire to enhance the characterization of
an attorney's role beyond a plain "advocate" is understandable, they could
have achieved a more precise result by using a modifier such as "ardent,"
34. John Morreall, Religious Faith, Militarism, and Humorlessness, 1 EUR.'S J.
PSYCHOL. 3 (August 2005), availableat http://ejop.psychopen.eu/article/view/369/272.
35. See, e.g., Allen K Harris, The Professionalism Crisis - The 'Z' Words and Other
Rambo Tactics: The Conference of Chief Justices' Solution, 53 S.C. L. REv. 549, 569-70
(2002) ("The phrase 'zealous advocacy' is frequently invoked to defend unprofessional
behavior and a 'Rambo,' or 'win at all costs,' attitude.").
36. See infra Section IV.
37. MERRIAM-WEBSTER, supranote 22, at http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/
advocate.
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"fervent," "strong," "committed," or a list of several other adjectives that
both convey strength and remain unburdened by the treacherous
connotations and risk of misunderstanding posed by "zealous."
One of the central problems plaguing legal ethics theory and practice
is that the "public citizen" role is an elusive concept. Finding a functional
definition of "public citizen" in the Rules, or anywhere else, is a frustrating
and fruitless endeavor. At a minimum, an attorney cannot derive much
confidence in her understanding of "public citizen" from any formulation
she assembles under the Rules or from scholarly analysis. This conundrum
is, in part, due to the Rules' delineation of distinct roles, followed by
extremely brief, generalized, and inadequate explanations of those roles.38
Other provisions, such as Paragraph Eight, then exacerbate the problem by
suggesting that there is no distinction between the "zealous advocate" and
"public citizen" roles in most scenarios. 39 Contemporary scholarship on
the topic is afflicted by the fact that its authors are mostly lawyers 40 whose
point of reference and longtime guiding principles are the Rules
themselves.
Thus, the daunting task of defining "public citizen" must begin by
looking to the root of the problem: the Rules. In Paragraph Six of the
Preamble, the Rules state that a lawyer's role as a "public citizen" includes
obligations to "seek improvement of the law, access to the legal system, the
administration of justice and the quality of service rendered by the legal
profession."41 However, the subsequent explanations of each of these
charges seem no more informative than the statement of the duties
themselves. In particular, the explanation of the duty to "seek ... the
administration of justice" requires a lawyer only to "be mindful of
deficiencies in the administration of justice and . . . to ensure equal access
to our system of justice for all those who because of economic or social
barriers cannot afford or secure adequate legal counsel."4 2
This explanation is problematic for two main reasons. First, it
prescribes a fairly passive role for the lawyer in administering justice in her
community; it only requires that a lawyer be aware of the system's
shortcomings, a proposition fundamentally incongruent with the magnitude

38. See generally MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT pmbl. (2009) (providing an

overview of the multiple duties and roles of attorneys).
39. Id. pmbl. 8.
40. See, e.g., Harris, supra note 35, at 549 n.I.
41. Id.pmbl. 6.
42. Id.
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of the public value the Rules seek to further.4 3 Surely, lawyers can
recognize when societal justice is not being administered, but recognition
alone clearly will not cure the underlying deficiencies. The Rules,
however, suggest no remedial action that the lawyer can or should take.
The Rules do encourage the "lawyer as public citizen" to assist people in
obtaining access to the justice system, the same system just characterized in
the previous sentence as deficient.4
The glaring problem, of course,
concerns the lack of responsibility the lawyer has to ensure an objectively
just outcome once she has ensured the requisite access to the system. It
defies logic to proactively connect victims of injustice with a system that
fails to command its officers to take any tangible action calculated to
promote the effective administration of justice. Thus, the Rules merely
create confusion and frustration regarding the meaning of the "public
citizen" role rather than provide any concrete and universal understanding
of the role.
The context in which the lawyer's "public citizen" role is typically
discussed illuminates the definitional conundrum from a different angle.
"Public citizen" is most often referred to as a lost role 4 5 that needs to be
reclaimed.4 6 A simple Internet search for "Lawyer as Public Citizen"
provides only links to the ABA Rules themselves and a few law review
articles advocating its resurrection. 7 Among these documents is the
transcript of a recent law school commencement address encouraging the
graduates to incorporate this role into their professional lives. 48 While
these proponents recognize the importance of the "public citizen" role and

43. See id. (acknowledging that attorneys must "be mindful of deficiencies in the
administration ofjustice").
44. Id.
45. See, e.g., Stephen N. Limbaugh, Jr., Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of Mo.,
Introductory Speech at the Missouri Bar/Judicial Conference (Sept. 12, 2002), available at
http://www.courts.mo.gov/page.jsp?id=1778 (explaining the need for lawyers to overcome
the perception of "greed and incivility"); see also Robert E. Scott, The Lawyer as Public
Citizen, 31 U. TOL. L. REv. 733, 733-37 (2000) (discussing how the role of attorneys as
public citizens "has been largely ignored in the current debate about the decline in
professionalism").
46. Michael S. Greco, The University of Akron School of Law Commencement
Address (May 20, 2007), in 41 AKRON L. REv. 337, 345 (2008).
47. The ensuing discussion is derived from a Google search for "Lawyer as Public
Citizen" conducted on Oct. 2, 2008.
48. Greco, supra note 46, at 345 ("We must reclaim that important role of Lawyer as
Public Citizen-for the personal fulfillment of each individual lawyer who engages in pro
bono and public service, for the betterment of our profession, and for the benefit of the
American people.").
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its deficient execution in practice, none attempt to define it. Perhaps they
are as unsure about its meaning as the ABA drafters. Perhaps the drafters
intended for lawyers to supply their own definition. 4 9 Virtually anything is
possible, as there is no legislative intent to aid in the interpretation of the
concept. The Rules fail even to suggest a philosophical model of "public
citizen" from which a lawyer's duties can be inferred, a problem that this
Article revisits in Section V.
Despite their inability to articulate the duties of the term, scholars and
critics appear to agree that the profession fails to fulfill its "public citizen"
role.5 o However, where one cannot define the duty, one cannot establish a
violation of that duty. Moreover, a fundamental principle of law is that one
cannot prosecute that which cannot be proven. Therefore, the definitional
dilemma has serious consequences for enforcement of the "public citizen"
duties as well, making it extremely difficult to establish professional
misconduct under the Rules absent concurrent legal misconduct.
SECTION II

Aside from the denotative and connotative problems described above,
the structure of the Preamble itself marginalizes the "public citizen" role."
This section addresses the impropriety of establishing "zealous advocate"
as the starting point and baseline for the characterization of the model
lawyer that the Rules seek to promulgate.
When describing a new concept, its proponent must first select a
baseline characterization or framework familiar to her audience. The

49. The past actions of the ABA defeat this proposition. For instance, the 1969 Model
Code of Professional Responsibility was divided into "Disciplinary Rules" and "Ethical
Considerations," the latter of which were only "aspirational" and unenforced. MODEL CODE
OF PROF'L RESPONSIBILITY (1969). Recognizing that such a precatory statement of ideals
was ineffective in securing compliance, the ABA recast many of them as sanctionable, black
letter rules in the 1983 Model Rules of ProfessionalConduct, which are currently in effect,
as amended. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT (2009). Thus, the ABA drafters clearly
understood the danger in leaving broad discretion in the ethical realm to the legal profession
and would likely not leave the definition of such a core duty in the hands of the group which
is bound by it. See WILLIAM H. SIMON, THE PRACTICE OF JUSTICE: A THEORY OF LAWYERS'
ETHICS 14-15 (1998) (explaining the implication of "black letter rule[s]" within legal ethics
and arguing that "the important issues of legal ethics require complex, contextual judgment"
(alteration in original)).
50. See, e.g., Greco, supra note 46, at 345 ("[W]e have too few lawyers performing
public service and pro bono work today in our communities."); Scott, supra note 45, at 733
(noting the "decline in professionalism").
51. See generally MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT pmbl. (2009).
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proponent then adds and subtracts components of other familiar concepts in
shaping her concept, including expansions and limitations on the degree of
those components. Once the concept has been adequately distinguished
and refined, the formulation is complete.
However, although the
subsequent modifications of the initial framework shape the distinct final
product, the initial concept remains the core factor influencing the overall
meaning of the new concept.
While important, the subsequent
modifications are necessarily less fundamental. Further, a failure to
articulate or explain such modifications sufficiently could cause the
proponent's audience to discount or ignore their application to the new
concept. 52
In characterizing the model lawyer in the Rules, the ABA drafters
engaged in the reasoning process just described, placing the lawyer's duties
as "zealous advocate" in this baseline role. In what he calls the "Dominant
View," William Simon asserts that "zealous advocacy" is the core principle
of the Bar's disciplinary codes.13 Regarding this role, Simon states, "The
basic precept is nearly always qualified by some norms intended to protect
third-party and public interests. But the basic precept remains the
governing norm. It influences and structures discussions. It functions as
both starting point and presumptive fallback position."5 4 Evidence
supporting these assertions permeates the Rules. "Zealous advocate" is
mentioned first in the Rules, it is defined and explained first, and it is
discussed more frequently than the "public citizen" role.55 Furthermore, as
an affirmative charge, "zealous advocacy" is structured as an empowering
concept or, as Simon puts it, the "governing norm."56 The role of "public
citizen," introduced subsequently, only functions as a modifier or
"qualifying norm" for the basic precept of "zealous advocate."5
As a
limitation on the baseline concept, "public citizen" is structurally a much
less fundamental component of the model lawyer under the Rules.
At this juncture, two further observations are critical. First, as
discussed in Section I, subsequent limitations or restrictions may not easily
modify a strong initial impression.s
The strong historical connotations

52. This framework for describing a new concept is one that I developed and was
inspired by William Simon's work in the discussions that follow.
53. SIMoN, supra note 49, at 7-8.
54. Id. at 8.
55. See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT pmbl.
56. SIMON, supranote 49, at 8.
57. See id.
58. See discussion of "halo effect" supra Section I.
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burdening the "zealous advocate" term, as both the "starting point" and
"governing norm," coupled with its greater emphasis in explanations and
discussions relative to "public citizen," may actually inhibit its
modification by the latter term. Second, as also discussed in Section I, the
lack of definition of the "public citizen" role may combine with the very
real possibility that a proponent of a concept or characterization could fail
in causing her audience to incorporate intended and desired modifications
to that concept or characterization if she fails to articulate or sufficiently
explain those modifications. Most commentators agree that the "public
citizen" role suffers greatly from lack of definition. 59 As Simon succinctly
puts it, the "public citizen" role "is less defined than the Dominant one."60
This lack of definition could prove fatal to a lawyer's understanding of
the broader, intended characterization of the model lawyer and could thus
inhibit the incorporation of "public citizen" considerations into her
decisions and actions. Even if an attorney wants to fulfill the "public
citizen" role, this noble aspiration is thwarted by the deficiencies in
definition and philosophical guidance needed to reconcile this duty with the
affirmative duty to act in ways inuring to the client's benefit under the
"zealous advocate" role. Likewise, Simon's characterization of "zealous
advocate" as the "presumptive fallback position" is particularly astute.61 It
encapsulates the truism that when a person cannot reconcile two conflicting
duties and must, therefore, choose between them, she will choose the
default position.6 2
For society, the adoption of "zealous advocate" as the default in the
Rules could have a devastating impact on the preservation and promotion
of justice. Each time the duties of "zealous advocate" and "public citizen"
conflict, a lawyer will presumptively gravitate towards loyalty to the
client. This tendency may well account for Simon's word choice in his
assertion that "[t]he basic precept is nearly always qualified by some norms
intended to protect third-party and public interests." 6 4 Rather than saying
"norms which protect," Simon's use of "norms intended to protect"
suggests that it is at least the perception of some scholars that the "public

59. See, e.g.,
60.

61.
62.
63.
64.

SIMON,

supra note 49, at 8; Scott, supra note 45, at 733-37.

SIMON, supra note 49, at 8.

Id.
See id.
See id. (maintaining that the zealous advocate role is the "fallback" position).
Id. (emphasis added).
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citizen" restrictions on "zealous advocate" that the drafters incorporated
into the Rules often fail to protect these interests.6 5
Just as conceptual deficiencies and default rules undercut the
likelihood of equal expression of the roles in practice, the reality in which
lawyers operate may also further encourage the predisposition of a
practitioner to fulfill her "zealous advocate" role at the expense of her
"public citizen" duties in many circumstances.
Whether such a result is objectively right or not, a client seeks victory
for her cause when she employs a lawyer.66 In fact, for the money she is
paying, she certainly expects it. As Rudolph Gerber asserts in his critique
of the realities of legal ethics practice under the Rules, "the [legal] system
and its participants seek victory, not truth. Litigation tactics are means to
the only goal that counts: a successful outcome, which, needless to say, is
unrelated to the right outcome., 67 Conversely, society values objective
justice and demands that a lawyer aid in its administration through the
codification of the "public citizen" role. Unlike the client, society is
concerned with the "right outcome." Although these goals are not mutually
exclusive, per se, they will conflict a significant percentage of the time,
placing the lawyer in a moral and ethical tug-of-war concerning her
professional duties to her client and to society. 68 As previously argued,
such scenarios implicate the default rule and its dominant expression over
other considerations and duties.
Aside from the pressures from the client to "zealously advocate,"
Gerber argues that compliance with the "public citizen" duties remains
unlikely due to lack of meaningful enforcement. 6 9 He observes that
lawyers go largely unchecked in their adherence to "zealous advocacy"
because "[t]rial and appellate judges, typically drawn from the litigation
bar, rarely have the spleen to control or denounce the tactics described
here."70 Even where a fairly obvious dereliction of the "public citizen"
duty exists, a lawyer can be confident that neither opposing counsel nor the
judge will fault her for choosing to fulfill the "zealous advocate" duties at
the expense of objective justice.71 Gerber emphasizes the frequency of this

65. See id. (emphasis added).
66. See RUDOLPH JOSEPH GERBER, LAWYERS, COURTS, AND PROFESSIONALISM: THE
AGENDA FOR REFORM 117 (1989) (noting that the point of a lawsuit is to seek victory).
67. Id. at 117.
68. See Scott, supra note 45, at 733-37.
69. See GERBER, supra note 66, at 117 (citing the complacency of the judiciary).
70. Id.
71. See id.
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circumstance by stating: "The Anglo-American adversary system has
strongly encouraged the role model judge as a smiling, passive ticket
holder at a lawyers' nightclub act.

. .

. We have cast our lot with our

litigation peers rather than with the public." 72 Thus, even the fear of
reprimand by the bar is often remote in practice, a fact that reinforces an
attorney's alignment of priorities with "zealous advocacy" rather than
"public citizen" under ambiguous or conflicting circumstances.
The potential for malpractice liability also underlies and influences the
Especially with the
"zealous advocate-public citizen" conundrum.
minimal chance of censure for failure to fulfill the "public citizen" role, a
lawyer faces a far greater danger when leaving the "zealous advocate"
duties unfulfilled.74 Although a lawyer may serve the ends of justice when
she comports with her "public citizen" role, a frustrated client is not likely
to appreciate that result the same way the attorney may. When failing to
act or acting contrary to one's "zealous advocacy" duties in favor of
"public citizen" concerns, moral and ethical serenity may come at a high
price. A slighted client has recourse both at laW75 and through the Bar. 6
Such a perceived dereliction of advocacy duties could become a nonfrivolous professional malpractice suit for performance below the standard
The client could alternatively or
of care expected in the field.
additionally file a colorable grievance for failure of the lawyer's duties of
diligence and competence79 in handling the client's business. Beyond
these severe considerations, the potential for censure by one's firm,
detriment to one's reputation in the legal and general community, and the
prospect of losing valuable client relationships steer a lawyer towards the
default role. Therefore, aside from being the expectation of one's client
and one's firm, "zealous advocacy" appears to be both the path of least
72. Id.

73. See, e.g., John Leubsdorf, Legal Malpractice and Professional Responsibility, 48
101, 117 (1995) (noting that judges and juries should rely on
professionalism rules in delineating the details of lawyers' duties to their clients in the
context of a legal malpractice claim).
74. Id.; see also Williams v. Callahan, 938 F. Supp. 36, 49 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (involving
a plaintiff bringing a legal malpractice action against his counsel for "failure to zealously
advocate plaintiff's cause").
75. Id.
76. See, e.g., MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.1, 1.3 (2009).
77. David J. Beck, Nature of Legal Malpractice, 43 BAYLOR L. REv. 43, 43 (1991)
RUTGERS L. REv.

(citation omitted) ("[T]he ultimate issue in a legal malpractice case is whether there has

been a breach of duty which causes damage.").
78. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.3.
79. Id. R. 1.1.
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resistance and the path of least risk. Despite the attending self-effacement,
an attorney immersed in a moral and ethical dilemma may often act in
fulfillment of the "zealous advocate" role, left to take consolation in the
fact that she satisfied at least one of her duties under the Rules.
SECTION III
The previous sections have articulated many of the conditions
predisposing a lawyer to conform to her "zealous advocacy" role when
faced with a conflict between the duties, including various external
pressures and fears, the divergent enforcement of the roles in practice, and
insufficient guidance in the Rules themselves for handling such scenarios.
This Section focuses on arguably the most dominant factor predicting
fulfillment of the "zealous advocate" role at the expense of the "public
citizen" role: legal education.
In its current design, legal education provides abundant reinforcement
of "zealous advocacy" by inculcating impressionable future lawyers with a
thorough understanding of this duty as well as the skills to achieve it
successfully.80 Conversely, the typical law school experience fails to
provide meaningful instruction regarding a lawyer's "public citizen" duties
and the skills needed to work through the moral and ethical conflicts they
will inevitably face at some point in their careers. 8 ' This dearth of
guidance leaves future lawyers poorly equipped to manage the most
difficult, and arguably most personally and societally consequential,
decisions they will make in their professional lives. 82
In its intensive study of sixteen representative law schools during the
1999-2000 academic year, the Carnegie Foundation found a shocking
uniformity of this phenomenon among law school programs. 8 3 The Report
Summary epitomizes these deficiencies in legal education by stating: "In
80. Indeed, since the founding of the National Institute for Trial Advocacy in 1971, trial
advocacy has become an established part of the law school curriculum in the United States.
Peter Toll Hoffman, Law Schools and the Changing Face of Practice, 56 N.Y.L. SCH. L.
REV. 203,210 (2011/12).
81. See, e.g., Carnegie Foundation for the Advancement of Teaching, Summary of
WILLIAM M. SULLIVAN ET AL., EDUCATING LAWYERS: PREPARATION FOR THE PROFESSION OF
LAW 6 (2007), available at http://www.carnegiefoundation.org/sites/default/files/

publications/elibrarypdf 632.pdf (discussing the lack of support for developing ethical and
social skills as one of the major limitations of legal education).
82. See Christina Harrison, A Crisis in Ethics, The National Jurist, Oct. 2009, at 16
(citing the financial crashes or near misses of AIG, Citibank, and Goldman Sachs in
concluding that ethics should be more greatly emphasized in legal education).
83. Carnegie Foundation, supranote 81, at 6.
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their all-consuming first year, students are told to set aside their desire for
justice. They are warned not to let their moral concerns or compassion for
the people in the cases they discuss cloud their legal analyses."4 While
this request to table moral and ethical considerations is arguably for very
practical reasons, i.e., to learn how to isolate the legal issues involved in a
problem with precision, the lack of emphasis on reintroducing those
considerations back into the analysis before moving on to the next topic is
more than a little disconcerting. The Carnegie Foundation researchers
reported that "[i]ssues such as the social needs or matters of justice
involved in cases do get attention in some case-dialogue classrooms, but
these issues are almost always treated as addenda."85
In particular, the cursory and post hoc treatment of issues which bear
such heavy personal and societal consequences creates three problems.
First, assuming that a graduate can recognize the moral and ethical issues
she later faces in practice and would like to reconcile her conflicting duties
to the client and society, her legal education poorly equips her to integrate
those important factors into her analysis. 86 Second, the under-emphasis of
moral and ethical concerns consonant with the "public citizen" role
communicates the message that such considerations are less important, or
at least more tangential, than successful execution of one's "zealous
advocate" duties, socializing students to disregard such analytical factors. 8 7
Third, after three years of checking morality at the door, graduates of the
current law school system may simply become jaded or indifferent to moral
concerns, robotically applying the legal analytical process to each fact
pattern without regard to its potentially dire consequences for morality,
justice, or other societal values.88 The tabling of moral issues in legal
education most likely translates into tabling such considerations in practice,
as the practice of law is naturally quite heavily influenced by the training
and habits acquired during legal education.89 Thus, the proverbial apple is

84. Id.
85. Id.
86. See id. (noting that if students are not taught to incorporate morality into their legal
analysis, "students have no way of learning when and how their moral concerns may be
relevant to their work as lawyers").
87. See id. ("Being told repeatedly that [moral and ethical considerations] fall, as they
do, outside the precise and orderly 'legal landscape,' students often conclude that they are
secondary to what really counts for success in law school-and in legal practice.").
88. See, e.g., Harrison, supra note 82, at 16 (acknowledging the connection between
lack of ethics and the financial ruin of companies such as AIG, Citibank, Goldman Sachs,
and Enron).
89. See Carnegie Foundation, supra note 81, at 6.
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not likely to fall far from the tree regarding the omission of a morality
component in one's legal analysis in practice after three years of omitting
moral concerns in law school.
Several legal ethics scholars are even more critical than the Carnegie
Foundation on the shortcomings of legal education. 90 In particular,
Rudolph Gerber asserts:
One cannot but wonder at the propriety of law school and bar advocacy
programs that instill in fledgling litigators a predilection for victory over
truth, and in the process bestow on each pupil a bursting bag of trial tricks
more like that of vaudeville actors than officers of the court.
Euphemistically disguised as "techniques of cross-examination" or "the art
of discovery," these programs too often emphasize not candor, careful
preparation, honesty, and fair dealing, but excessive client loyalty and
sleight-of-hand devices. The programs often suggest using these devices
when virtue alone is not enough to win.91
In his scathing criticism of the legal educational system, Gerber emphasizes
the prevalence of educators cloaking morally and ethically questionable
tools for fulfilling the "zealous advocate" role with neutral and
inconspicuous titles.92 Gerber drives home the focus of legal education on
"zealous advocacy" and rationalization of morally and ethically
questionable means under the Rules by stressing that "[i]n the courtroom,
these tactics are defended as 'zeal."' 9 3 Further, he quickly adds the
disastrous implications that this rationalization process, enabled by the
current formulation of the Rules, has on society. 9 4 He asserts: "Zealous
advocacy has become the buzzword squeezing decency and civility out of
the profession. Zealous advocacy is the modern day plague that weakens
the truth-finding process and makes a mockery of the lawyer [sic] claim to
be an officer of the court." 95
As Gerber points out, these "devices" and "tactics" disseminated in
legal education focus exclusively on winning. 9 6 The danger, of course, is
the cumulative effect of winning at all costs on the moral integrity of the
profession and the sacrifice of societal values for a few individual
triumphs. When the focus is only on the end of winning, a view which an
90. See GERBER, supra note 66, at 116-21 (evaluating the negative affects the role of
"zealous advocate" has on the legal profession).
91. Id. at 117.
92. Id.
93. Id.
94. Id.
95. Id.
96. Id.
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exclusively "zealous advocate" model of representation promotes, the
means of achieving that end receive less scrutiny, whether ethical or not. 9 7
The current system under the Rules, although diversified in form, is an
exclusively "zealous advocate" model in fact.
Maintaining such a system has ruinous implications for the morality of
individual practitioners as well as for societal values. Gerber encapsulated
this idea in his assertion that "putting victory ahead of truth is a Pyrrhic
Victory at best." 9 8 Gerber's allusion to the lessons of history is quite apt in
the legal ethics context. Upon being congratulated after his victories over
the Romans at Heraclea in 280 B.C. and Asculum in 279 B.C., King
Pyrrhus of Epirus is reported as saying, "[i]f we are victorious in one more
battle with the Romans, we shall be utterly ruined," referencing the
devastating casualties his army sustained in those battles. 99 Thus, a Pyrrhic
Victory is not a victory at all. It is a victory accompanied by enormous
losses and costs which leaves the victor in as desperate shape as if he had
lost. 00 In the practice of law, a lawyer's focus on winning at all costs
could have Pyrrhic implications for her own moral integrity as well as for
society's goal of achieving and preserving objective justice through the
legal system.
In my own experience, I can attest that the arguments presented in this
section and the findings of the Carnegie Report are the reality in legal
education. I have found that professors often avoid discussions of moral
issues and implications, focusing on the substantive material "in the interest
of time," or other like justifications. During Convocation, one of the first
things my class was taught is that we must "strive to learn the law and
processes well over the next three years so that we can be 'zealous
advocates' for our future clients." While some lip-service may have been
paid to our role as "public citizen," the impression left in my mind was of
the former role alone. This impression was reinforced just a few days later
in a reading assignment from our Contracts textbook, containing Lord
Brougham's famous statement to the House of Lords in representation of
Queen Caroline in her divorce from King George IV.10 He asserted:

97. See id.; see also Carnegie Foundation, supra note 81, at 6.
98. GERBER, supra note 66, at 122.
99. 9 PLUTARCH, PLUTARCH'S LivEs: DEMETRIUS AND ANTONY, PYRRHUS AND CAIUS
MARIUS 417 (Bernadotte Perrin trans., 1920).
100. See id. at 416-17 (explaining the devastating losses Pyrrhus' army had suffered and
its affect on both the morality of the men and his ability to wage war in the future).
101. E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH ET AL., CONTRACTS: CASES AND MATERIALS 49-50 (6th ed.
2001).
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[A]n advocate, by the sacred duty which he owes his client, knows in the
discharge of that office but one person in the world: that client and none
other. ... Nay, separating even the duties of a patriot from those of an
advocate, and casting them if need be to the wind, he must go on reckless
of the consequences, if his fate it should unhappily be to involve his
country in confusion for his client's protection. 102
Lord Brougham's quote epitomizes the demands of "zealous advocacy,"
and his "reckless" devotion to his client's interests is exalted as the model
example of legal representation for his impressionable readers.1 0 3 The clear
purpose of this inclusion is to inculcate pupils with the charge of their
future profession.
The textbook chosen for our second-year Evidence course supports the
truth of the foregoing assertions as well, observing that "counsel in an
adversary system often are focused on winning, not on procedural values
like getting at the truth." 10 4 The authors then refrain from making an
evaluation of the propriety of such a circumstance, missing a golden
opportunity to address this issue.105 Their avoidance of judgment here
provides just another common example of educators familiarizing the
future lawyer with the reality of practice, without any commentary on
whether such a perspective is proper. 1 0 6 At a minimum, it conditions law
students to recognize that they need to be prepared to face these "zealous"
lawyers with equal resistance or fail as effective counsel for their clients. 107
Basic behavioral psychology principles suggest that this lack of
reinforcement concerning an attorney's "public citizen" duties, coupled
with the strong incentives associated with winning and prevalent training
towards that end, creates conditions not only conducive to-but nearly
guaranteed to produce-a dominant focus on the much less restrictive
"zealous advocate" duties as a rationale for attorney conduct. However,
entirely aside from the negative impact on society, succumbing to the
102. Id.
103. See Lawrence J. Vilardo & Vincent E. Doyle III, Where Did the Zeal Go?, A.B.A.
LITIG. J. (Fall 2011), available at http://www.americanbar.org/publications/litigation
journal/201 1_12/fall/where did zeal go.html ("In the United States, at least, Brougham's
opening statement inspired the view that attorneys were duty-bound to advance their client's
interests through any and all legal means-that is, to represent their clients with zeal.").
104. DAVID P. LEONARD & VICTOR J. GOLD, EVIDENCE: A STRUCTURED APPROACH 428
(2d ed. 2008).
105. See id. (transitioning immediately into a discussion about commonly employed
objections).
106. See, e.g., id.(ignoring any moral or ethical issues within our adversarial system).
107. See id. (discussing the need to protect witnesses from zealous attorneys using
objections).
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pressures and temptations "to practice [law] in a way that creates shortterm advantage" at the expense of one's morals and ethical values could
have significant consequences for the lawyer herself.'08
Commentators observe that many practitioners develop career
dissatisfaction over time from dealing with the numerous pressures and
expectations encouraging them to advocate with moral detachment.' 0 9 As
Robert Vischer points out, the Rules themselves suggest that a lawyer is not
morally accountable for pursuing a client's objectives. 10 Rule 1.2(b)
explicitly states that "[a] lawyer's representation of a client . . . does not
constitute an endorsement of the client's political, economic, social or
moral views or activities.""' However, such compartmentalization is
difficult to achieve in actuality, and lawyers who have convinced
themselves that they can shelve their personal morality while "zealously"
asserting a particular claim often find themselves burdened with a heavy
conscience afterwards. Even though the Rules support what some scholars
call the "Nonaccountability Thesis,"ll 2 Vischer explains that a lawyer
engaged in "amoral" advocacy cannot always escape the personal
He
consequences of practicing law in a morally detached manner. '
warns:
Ignoring the potential for interpersonal moral engagement in the course of
an attorney's work comes at a significant professional cost. From the
attorney's perspective, it can exacerbate the perceived incoherence of her

life, widening the gap between her professional role and her understanding
of social justice, moral truth, and the common good. The segmentation of a
lawyer's personal and professional identities can be profoundly unsettling

for the lawyer herself, especially if the lawyer has deeply held beliefs that
do not speak only to the non-professional aspects of her existence.

14

In reality, the Rules' disclaimer clause is not enough to absolve one's

conscience.

This circumstance could also explain the high incidence of

substance abuse among attorneys who seek an escape from their guilt and

108. Scott, supra note 45, at 736.
109. See, e.g., SIMON, supra note 49, at 1 (describing the law as an "anxious profession"
that "consistently disappoints the [moral] aspirations it encourages").
110. Robert K. Vischer, Moral Engagement Without the "Moral Law": A Post-Canons
View of Attorneys' Moral Accountability, in LEGAL STUDIES RESEARCH PAPER SERIEs, at 2

(Univ. of St. Thomas Sch. of Law Legal Studies Research Paper No. 08-01, 2008), available
at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstractid=l 104477#.
111. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.2(b) (2009).
112. Vischer, supranote 110, at 4.
113. Id. at 14-15.
114. Id. at 14.
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self-disgust after years of asserting claims at odds with their moral values;
the prevalence of lawyer assistance programs for substance abuse provided
by the state bars of most states suggests some veracity to this latter
hypothesis."'
The problems with the current model of legal education, as with the
current Rules, are deep. These problems ultimately have a profound
impact, not only on society and its common values, but also on the personal
lives of the lawyers they train." 6 Technical skills and knowledge are only
part of the puzzle for practicing law in an effective and fulfilled manner.
While many educators know this truism, they fail to take opportunities to
impart that important message to their students, who in turn form the
impression that strong technical skills and knowledge are all they need to
meet their duties as lawyers to their clients and to lead fulfilling
professional lives." 8 In not addressing these important issues and
equipping their students to handle such challenging scenarios, law schools
fail those future lawyers at great personal and societal cost. Likewise, the
Rules' failure to adequately define and explain the equally important roles,
coupled with the Rules' failure to acknowledge and provide meaningful
guidance for the conflicts lawyers will realistically face in their endeavor to
fulfill these duties, cripples lawyers' ability to reconcile their roles and to
achieve the comfort associated with certainty that one has done all that is
required of her.
SECTION IV

While not exhaustive, the previous sections have outlined many of the
practical problems with the Rules and contemporary legal education. Legal
ethics scholars and commentators have done so before to varying degrees
and by focusing on varying angles." 9 Many go beyond identifying the
115. See, e.g., NORTH CAROLINA LAWYER'S ASSISTANCE PROGRAM, http://www.nclap.org

(last visited Jan. 15, 2013) ("The Lawyer Assistance Program (LAP) is a service of the
North Carolina State Bar which provides confidential assistance to North Carolina lawyers
to help them identify and address problems with alcoholism, other drug addictions and
mental health disorders."). Confidentiality of disclosures within the program is protected
under the North Carolina Rules of Professional Conduct. N.C. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT
R. 1.6(c).
116. Harrison, supranote 82, at 18.
117. See Carnegie Foundation, supra note 81, at 6 (noting that the practice of law
requires attention to moral and ethical issues).
118. Id.
119. See, e.g., Charles P. Curtis, The Ethics of Advocacy, 4 STAN. L. REv. 3 (1951);
SIMON, supra note 49; Vischer, supranote 110.
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problem and propose solutions. 12 0 However, none of these solutions seem
entirely fulfilling. This Section briefly outlines and critiques the proposals
of a handful of these commentators. Section V culls a few useful elements
from their suggestions and combines them with some unique ideas in a new
proposed solution.
In his "Contextual View," William Simon advances the new basic
maxim that "lawyer[s] should take such actions as, considering the relevant
circumstances of the particular case, seem likely to promote justice." 21 if
implemented, this perspective would refocus the lawyer on achieving
objectively just results-away from the confusing and conflicting duties as
"zealous advocate" and "public citizen" under the Rules. 12 2 Simon notes
that justice transcends the client's self-serving interpretation of the concept
and is not always furthered by a victory on her behalf.123 He also points out
the reality that societal justice and justice as subjectively understood by the
client only overlap by coincidence.12 4
Simon's model makes the
administration of objective, societal justice the lawyer's highest priority. 2 5
His proposed solution to the disarray of the current Rules aligns the duties
of the lawyer with those placed on the prosecutor.12 6 Suggesting that the
drafters substitute "win" for "convict" as the lawyer's new duty, he quotes
the Model Code's charge to prosecutors: "The responsibility of a public
prosecutor . . . is to seek justice, not merely to convict."l 27
In a law review article entitled "The Ethics of Advocacy," Charles
Curtis attempts to explain the oft-paradoxical duties and obligations
attending the practice of law. 12 8 His article focuses on discussing the
expectations lay society has for its lawyers as well as the sources of its
general confusion regarding a lawyer's conflicting loyalties. 129 Using a
number of didactic examples and hypotheticals, Curtis attempts to

120. See, e.g., SIMON, supra note 49, at 9 (proposing replacing the basic maxim of
"zealous advocate" with "action[] ... likely to promote justice"); Vischer, supra note 110,
at 28-29 (discussing a course developed for the St. Thomas School of Law in order to
introduce a more in-depth discussion of ethics in the first year of legal education).
121. SIMON, supra note 49, at 9.

122. See id. at 9-10 (explaining that abstract norms are not always subjective).
123. Id. at 11 ("Lawyers in this view are not simply self-seeking profit maximizers, but
people who seek satisfaction and respect in the performance of a socially valuable role.").
124. Id. at 10.
125. Id. at 9.
126. Id. at 10-11.
127. Id. at 10 (quoting MODEL CODE OF PROF'L REPoNsBIBLITY EC 7-13 (1980)).
128. Curtis, supra note 119.
129. Id.
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illuminate the intricate distinctions which he believes present various
contradictions in a lawyer's duties.130 Most notably, he faults the Rules'
predecessor, the ABA Canons of ProfessionalEthics, which were in effect
at the time he wrote his article, for the deficiencies in definition,
explanation, and guidance which plague the current Rules.'31 In his article,
Curtis laments the need to interpret the Canons at all, arguing that their
drafters should have been more explicit, and cites several ambiguous areas
in need of clarity.132 He posits that many of the interpretive problems and
much of the confusion which troubles the profession, as well as the general
public, could have been easily avoided with clearer drafting.' 33
Other scholars, such as Robert Vischer, emphasize the importance of
changes to the priority and manner of addressing moral issues in legal
education.1 34 At the University of St. Thomas Law School in Minnesota,
where Vischer teaches, the curriculum requires that first-year students take
a course titled "Foundations of Justice." 35 Substantively, the course
deviates greatly from the rule-based "professional responsibility" course
students traditionally encounter in their second year, which merely helps
students develop an understanding of the Model Rules of Professional
Conduct sufficient to pass the Multi-State Professional Responsibility
Exam and to fulfill an ABA curriculum requirement.' 36 Instead of
memorizing rules and Ethics Opinions, Vischer's course guides students to
engage in debate and discourse concerning historical legal scenarios which
raise issues that are "inescapably moral" in nature.' 37 The stated goal of
these discussions is "to equip students with the tools with which to discern
and articulate the moral considerations in legal representation without
jeopardizing its client-centered nature."13
The course is intentionally
130. Id. at 6-18.
131. Id. at 4-6, 11.
132. Id. at 11. Curtis attempts to explain the ABA Committee on Professional Ethics'
statements that "[a] lawyer is an officer of the court. His obligation to the public is no less
significant than his obligation to his client. His oath binds him to the highest fidelity to the
court as well as to his client." Id. He states: "The Committee should have gone on to
distinguish a lawyer's loyalties. The court has priority over the client in matters of law and
the client has a priority over the court in matters of fact." Id. (emphasis added). Thus, one
can see that a short explanation here clarifies what is otherwise a blatant contradiction in
duties.
133. Id.
134. See Vischer, supra note 110, at 27-33.
135. Id. at 28.
136. See id at 28-30 (listing the various topics that "Foundations of Justice" covers).
137. Id. at 28-30.
138. Id. at 28.
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placed at the beginning of the curriculum to ensure its teachings in moral
engagement form part of the analytical foundation that students develop at
the outset of their legal education. 3 This placement also allows professors
and students to explore moral issues in later courses more easily and helps
students make moral considerations a routine part of their analysis as they
prepare for practice.140
Although Simon, Curtis, and Vischer expose important issues with the
current system of ethical duties, none provides a comprehensive solution
calculated to guide an attorney through many of the most difficult and
trying professional dilemmas. In the next Section, I incorporate the ideas
above into a proposal which would revise the structure and content of the
Rules to provide more clarity in their interpretation as well as guidance for
unanticipated scenarios.
SECTION V

The multifaceted nature of the ethical debasement marring the legal
profession today reflects a complexity that defies easy solution. The sheer
number of problems, factors, and pressures challenging an ethical lawyer's
efforts to balance the often-conflicting roles placed on lawyers by the Rules
presents an especially difficult scenario to address comprehensively. Some
are deeply rooted in habits and traditions of the profession.14 1 Some
permeate the legal educational system.14 2 Some are external to the lawyer
and firm; some are internal. Some are systemic-codified and perpetuated
by the Rules themselves.14 3 This Article is far from exhaustive. While my
solution may have shortcomings, it should provide a manageable start and
expose part of the agenda for discourse and reform.
Reform must start with the Rules themselves. The Rules influence the
actions and philosophies of legal educators, practitioners, and the courts.144
Put differently, the Rules guide and regulate the participants in the
profession from the initial stages of their socialization until their retirement.
Thus, the problems contained therein are particularly salient.

139. Id. at 30.
140. Id.
141. See Curtis, supra note 119, at 4 (noting the "sacred duty" owed to the client)
(citation omitted).
142. See Carnegie Foundation, supra note 81, at 6.
143. See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT pmbl. 2 (promoting zealous advocacy).
144. See id. scope TT 1-2 (describing the Rules as either "imperative" or "permissive"
and explaining that the Rules "shap[e] the lawyer's role").
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In addressing the issues in the Rules, I propose five main areas of
reform. First, the ABA drafters should revise or abandon the term "zealous
advocate" in favor of milder language. As discussed in Section I, the
connotations and power of that combination may exceed the effect the
drafters sought to achieve. Adopting in every case the advocacy style of
Lord Brougham, who was willing to risk the guillotine for his client, would
inevitably produce Pyrrhic consequences for one's moral and ethical
integrity, as well as the values of society and reputation of the profession.
As a profession, we cannot be willing to sacrifice everything to win.
"Zealousness" implies blindness to-or at least disregard for-any
countervailing considerations, regardless of merit. "Zealous" devotion is
complete. In a calculus of the spirit, it leaves no remainder. In requiring it,
the Rules leave nothing for the lawyer's other purported duties as "public
citizen" and the third role of "officer of the court." It is implausible that
the drafters intended for them to be so severely marginalized. A better
explanation is that the drafters overshot their intended characterization of a
lawyer as advocate. They meant to emphasize passion and devotion to
one's representations but employed a term embodying the most radical
form of these concepts. To that end, the drafters should replace "zealous"
with "committed." The connotations of the new modifier are positive, and
the risk of misinterpretation is greatly reduced. It conveys strength and
firmness but retains room for moral and ethical reflection. 145
Second, the Rules should explicitly align the duties of the lawyer with
those of the prosecutor. Borrowing from Simon's suggestion outlined in
Section IV,14 6 the only substitutions would be "lawyer" for "prosecutor"
and "win" for "convict."1 4 7 This modification could help emphasize the
importance of a lawyer's other duties, which currently receive lower
priority than "zealous advocacy." In addition, an explicit statement that "a
lawyer bears the dual responsibility to fulfill the equal roles of public
citizen and committed advocate" could provide a clear reminder that
prioritization of one role at the expense of another is inappropriate. It
would also dispense with any uncertainty in the Preamble that the roles are
meant to be equal. Although the equality of the roles can be inferred from
the structure of the Preamble, a principle of such importance should not be

145. "Committed" is merely a suggestion. My main concern is that the modifier
"zealous" is replaced in the text of the Rules rather than any specific term being used to
replace it.

146. See supra Section IV.
147. The resulting charge in the Rules would be: "The responsibility of a lawyer is to
seek justice, not merely to win."
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left to inferences. Further, note the change in positional priority of "public
citizen" in the proposed revision above. Although the express use of
"equal" should dispel misunderstandings regarding priority of the roles, an
erroneous interpretation favoring "public citizen" over "committed
advocate" does not endanger societal justice and moral integrity in the
same way that reversing the terms does.
Third, drawing from Curtis' suggestions, the drafters should elaborate
on the explanations of the roles and their corresponding duties in the
Rules. 148 As discussed above, the current explanations of roles and duties
in the Rules are short and inadequate. 14 9 In addition to expanding these
explanations, the drafters should explain the common interplay between
roles and embrace a more realistic view regarding the probability of
conflict between the demands of the roles, detailing the expectations and
duties of an attorney under such scenarios. Such elaboration in the
comments does not need to be exhaustive by any measure, but more
guidance is needed and would greatly help attorneys understand their full
responsibilities. Even if their current assertion that "the roles are usually
harmonious" is true, the drafters still fail to guide lawyers facing difficult
conflicts in their required roles when they merely suggest that lawyers
should "assume that justice is being done."150 That overinclusive and,
therefore, faulty premise must be eliminated.
Fourth, the drafters should adopt a philosophical model in the
Preamble as a gap-filler and underlying guide to the Rules. The addition of
the explanations and revisions proposed above would fail to account for
every possible conflict, question, or interpretation problem that may arise;
thus, the provision of a philosophical model as an interpretive guide for
ambiguous or unaddressed circumstances could assist attorneys in striking
a satisfying balance between competing duties.
The model would
essentially function in the capacity of legislative history, providing a
tangible paradigm from which the intent and spirit of the Rules could be
garnered.
Currently, the overwhelming focus on "winning" in the legal
profession, vis-A-vis its "zealous advocate" origin, represents the Spartan
The Spartans were historically renowned for their
model of society.'

148. See supra Section IV.
149. See supra Section I.
150. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT pmbl. 8 (2009).
151. See J. David Knottnerus, Spartan Society: Structural Ritualization in an Ancient
Social System, 27 HUMBOLDT J. OF Soc. REL. 1, 7-8 (2002) (describing how Spartan
institutional practices served to accustom youth to a militaristic way of life).
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fearless military prowess.152 Fulfillment for men was dominance on the
battlefield or a glorious death in that pursuit; fulfillment for women was
giving birth to a son who was fit to be a Spartan warrior. 53 All resources
and efforts in the society were directed towards achieving victory in
battle.154 The legal profession should not be idolizing victory in the
courtroom in the same way. Although the drafters have not explicitly
endorsed any philosophy as a model, the legal profession has recently
adopted the Spartan model as its default to fill this need. As Robert Scott
posits, "the practice of law has evolved from a 'professional calling' to the
efficient delivery of skilled services in a competitive market." 55 An
unspoken implication is that "skilled services" are those which are likely to
produce victory.
The express provision of a different model which emphasizes
desirable values could supplant this arbitrary default. Although other
philosophical models are available, I propose the Rules expressly adopt the
56
In
Periclean model as articulated in Pericles' famous Funeral Oration.1
his address to the Athenian people mourning the loss of many soldiers after
a campaign in the Peloponnesian War, Pericles distinguished Athens from
bellicose societies like Sparta, whose sole focus was on military victory.' 57
In particular, he praised Athens for its diversity in values, skills, and
professions, while noting that it still accomplished great things on the
battlefield.' 5 8 Each member of Athenian society, in his view, wore many
hats.'" 9 This model is the ideal to which lawyers should turn as a guiding
philosophy in the Rules: fulfillment of client objectives in the courtroom,
but also fulfillment of "public citizen" and "officer of the court" roles. By
establishing the three roles of the lawyer, the drafters have already
suggested that they intended to follow the Periclean model. Now, they
should align the content to match this ideal and provide an explication of
the philosophy for situations where even that content would not suffice.

152. Id.; see also STEPHEN PETER ROSEN, SOCIETIES AND MILITARY POWER: INDIA AND ITS
85 (1996).
153. Spartans, HISTORY.COM, http://www.history.com/topics/spartans (last visited Jan.
15, 2013).
154. See Knottnerus, supra note 151, at 7-8.
155. Scott, supra note 45, at 736.
156. THUCYDIDES, HISTORY OF THE PELOPONNESIAN WAR 143-51 (Rex Warner trans.,
Penguin Books rev. ed. 1972).
157. Id. at 146.
158. Id. at 146-48.
159. See id. (describing the Athenian people as unique in their governmental institutions,
intellect, and love of art).
ARMIEs
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Although such an adoption would still suffer from some grey areas and
interpretation problems in practice, a lawyer striving to fulfill her duties
under the Rules would at least have a better sense of when she was way off
course.
Finally, although a successful reform effort needs to focus on the
Rules, legal education must also change. With empirical data emerging
from intensive studies such as the Carnegie Report, the deficiencies of the
current legal educational model in preparing young lawyers to face the
moral and ethical challenges of practice are being exposed more
frequently. 160 In recent years, this part of the reform effort seems to be
well-discussed by scholars and commentators.16 ' Many of their solutions
appear promising and simply need to gain support and momentum.
However, law schools need to expedite a few key changes.
Although many curricula incorporate legal ethics electives and
seminars beyond the required rule-based professionalism class,16 2 these
courses need to be elevated to required, core classes. Further, they should
be taught in the first semester. By emphasizing the importance of such
issues and considerations in one's legal analysis from the beginning, the
courses would have the greatest impact on the socialization of
impressionable young lawyers into the profession. In addition, deans
should require faculty to reserve time to engage in dialogue about moral
and ethical issues raised in substantive classes, which have traditionally
glossed over such concerns or treated them as addenda.
Overall, law schools need to develop a greater awareness and urgency
around ensuring that their graduates possess more than simply the bag of
tricks needed to become effective mercenaries for their clients. With a
little thought and re-prioritizing of the curriculum, this broader focus can
be implemented successfully in the classroom to the betterment of the
student, the profession, and society.

160. See Carnegie Foundation, supra note 81, at 5-7 (examining the deficiencies in legal
education).
161. See, e.g., Harrison,supra note 82, at 16 (discussing the current crisis in ethics and
the place or morality in law school classrooms).
162. For instance, Campbell University's School of Law offers an elective course on
Advanced Legal Ethics. Course Catalog, Campbell University Norman Adrian Wiggins
School of Law, http://law.campbell.edu/page.cfm?id=391&n=course-catalog (last visited
Jan. 15, 2013).
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CONCLUSION

The ABA drafters may have intended for the "zealous advocate" and
"public citizen" duties to be equal charges by their embodiment in the
Rules. However, the lack of clarity in the Rules beyond the use of a term
carrying heavy connotations, as well as the focus of legal education on
learning how to win, the numerous sources of pressure to win, and other
forces, severely tips the scales in favor of the attorney adhering to her
"zealous advocate" duties, regardless of the resulting detriment to both
personal and societal values. Arguably, each victory where these values
are sacrificed for individual triumph constitutes a Pyrrhic victory-and this
is certainly so in the aggregate.
By looking at the various factors at play, one can see how the deck is
stacked against the fulfillment of the "public citizen" role. After all, what
lawyer has time to worry about a role which the Rules cannot define when
her clients demand results; when her senior partner demands results; when
her creditors from her law school student loans demand payment; when she
has a family to provide for; and when the very norm of the profession is
"zealous advocacy," which satisfies all these recently mentioned demands.
All she must do is relax her moral grounding.
Lawyer as "public citizen" must entail more than the Rules'
explanation of merely "providing the poor with access to the legal system"
or, as the recent President of the ABA described in his commencement
address to the 2007 graduating class at the University of Akron School of
Law, simply doing more pro bono.163 Lawyer as "public citizen" includes
the duty to ensure that the societal value of justice is achieved, that legal
actions are the product of sound moral and ethical discourse, and that
members of the legal profession are focused on more than just winning. As
a "public citizen," a lawyer's services and morality are not just
commodities for her clients. A "public citizen's" duties are, after all,
"public."

163. Greco, supra note 46, at 345.
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